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Abstract
The tragedy of the digital commons does not prevent the copious
voluntary production of content that one witnesses in the web. We
show through an analysis of a massive data set from YouTube that
the productivity exhibited in crowdsourcing exhibits a strong posi-
tive dependence on attention, measured by the number of downloads.
Conversely, a lack of attention leads to a decrease in the number of
videos uploaded and the consequent drop in productivity, which in
many cases asymptotes to no uploads whatsoever. Moreover, upload-
ers compare themselves to others when having low productivity and
to themselves when exceeding a threshold.
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We are witnessing an inversion of the traditional way by which content
has been generated and consumed over the centuries. From photography to
news and encyclopedic knowledge, the centuries-old pattern has been one in
which a relatively few people and organizations produce content and most
people consume it. With the advent of the web and the ease with which
one can migrate content to it, that pattern has reversed, leading to a sit-
uation whereby millions create content in the form of blogs, news, videos,
music, etc. and relatively few can attend to it all. This phenomenon, which
goes under the name of crowdsourcing, is exemplified by websites such as
Digg, Flicker, YouTube, and Wikipedia, where content creation without
the traditional quality filters manages to produce sought out movies, news
and even knowledge that rivals the best encyclopedias. That such content
is valued is confirmed by the fact that access to these sites accounts for a
sizable percentage of internet traffic. For example, as of June, 2007 YouTube
alone comprised approximately 20% of all HTTP traffic, or nearly 10% of all
traffic on the Internet [2].
What makes crowdsourcing both interesting and puzzling is the under-
lying dilemma facing every contributor, which is best exemplified by the
well-known tragedy of the commons. In such dilemmas, a group of people
attempts to provide a common good in the absence of a central authority. In
the case of crowdsourcing, the common good is in the form or videos, music,
or encyclopedic knowledge that can be freely accessed by anyone. Further-
more, the good has jointness of supply, which means that its consumption
by others does not affect the amounts that other users can use. And since
it is nearly impossible to exclude non contributors from using the common
good, it is rational for individuals not to upload content and free ride on
the production of others. The dilemma ensues when every individual can
reason this way and free ride on the efforts of others, making everyone worse
off—thus the tragedy of the digital commons [1, 3, 7, 5, 10].
And yet paradoxically, there is ample evidence that while the ratio of
contributions to downloads is indeed small, the growth in content provision
persists at levels that are hard to understand if analyzed from a public goods
point of view. One possible explanation for this puzzling behavior, which
we explore in this paper, is that those contributing to the digital commons
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perceive it as a private good, in which payment for their efforts is in the form
of the attention that their content gathers in the form of media downloads
or news clicked on. As it has been shown, attention is such a valued resource
that people are often willing to forsake financial gain to obtain it [6]. In
the world of academia, for example, attention is often its main currency, for
we publish to get the attention of others, we cite so that other researcher’s
work get attention, and we cherish the prominence of great work if only
because of the attention it gathers [4]. Similarly, within online communities,
status and recognition have been shown to be very important motivators for
contributing [9].1
If attention is indeed the main driver of contributions to the digital com-
mons, one should be able to observe a correlation between the rate at which
content is generated and the number of downloads. And if in addition a
causal relation between the two does exist, we expect that those contributors
that have a high level of downloads will continue to contribute, whereas those
who see a decline in the attention that their content is receiving will decrease
their productivity.
In order to investigate this conjecture we collected data from YouTube, a
popular website that allows its users to upload, view, and share video clips.
After a YouTube user uploads a video, a “view count” number is immediately
displayed next to the video title, which measures how many times it has been
watched. Our dataset contained 9,896,816 videos submitted by 579,471 users
by April 30, 2008. For each video upload we obtained its datestamp, the
uploader’s id, and the final view count.
To study the dynamic interplay between productivity and attention, we
partitioned time into 2-week periods, starting when they upload their first
video and ending when they upload their last one. A common pattern we
observed is that most periods between a contributor’s first and last uploads
contain no uploads at all (on average, 66% of these periods are empty), in-
dicating an intermittent productivity. Because of the bursty nature of our
1Another important instance is open source software development. Several studies
have shown however, that open source projects are characterized by a very small core of
contributors [11] where the free-riding problem is not acute.
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data, we considered only the “active” periods for each contributor (i.e. peri-
ods containing at least one upload), and labeled them as t = 1, 2, . . . .
We measured the productivity of each contributor by the number of videos
nt she uploads during the t’th active period, and the attention she receives by
the average number of views vt of the nt videos. In other words we wanted to
establish how vt affects nt+1, nt+2, . . . , which provides dynamical information
on how each contributor responds to different amounts of attention.
We conducted a robust linear regression {nt+1}Tt=1 ∼ α{log10 vt}Tt=1 + β
for each contributor that was active for T > 10 periods [12]. (Because the
view counts varied over many orders of magnitudes, it made sense to consider
log10 vt instead of vt.) We thus collected 76,462 α values and conducted a t-
test of the null hypothesis that the α values come from a normal distribution
with non-positive mean. The resulting p-value is less than 0.001, suggesting
that the null hypothesis can be rejected. We also conducted the same test
with different choices of T , and observed that as long as T > 10 the p-value
was always less than 0.001. Hence, for those contributors who were active for
a minimum number of periods, the more views they received in one period,
the more videos they uploaded during the following period.
A more direct approach to test our conjecture is to measure the change
in each contributor’s productivity at different attention levels. For each
contributor who was active for at least two different periods, define v¯ =
median{vt}T−1t=1 as her median received attention, where T is her number of
active periods. According to this definition, all periods can be divided into
two groups of equal size, b(T − 1)/2c: the “good periods” in which she re-
ceives higher than usual attention (G = {s : vs > v¯}), and the “bad periods”
in which she receives lower than usual attention (B = {s : vs < v¯}).
Let nG = 1b(T−1)/2c
∑
s∈G ns+1 denote the average productivity following a
good period, and let nB = 1b(T−1)/2c
∑
s∈B ns+1 denote the average productiv-
ity following a bad period. With these definitions the difference ∆ = nG−nB
measures the change of a contributor’s productivity between different atten-
tion levels. If ∆ > 0 contributors upload more videos after obtaining more
views, and if ∆ < 0 the opposite is true.
4
Figure 1 shows the histogram of the different 20,061 ∆ values for the
group of contributors who were active for 2 to 9 periods. A t-test of the null
hypothesis that ∆ ≤ 0 yields a p-value less than 0.001, leading to rejection
of the null hypothesis. Thus on average each contributor becomes more
productive after a good period than a bad period.
Figure 1: Histogram of contributor’s ∆ values for contributors that were
active from 2 to 9 weeks. Notice that the maximum of the histogram is
shifted to the right of the origin. The null hypothesis that data comes
form a normal distribution with non-positive mean, can be rejected with
p-value less than 0.001.
Figure 1 indicates that each contributor tends to become more productive
after receiving a number of views that exceeds her own normal performance.
One can also test whether his productivity increases as she outperforms the
average contributor in the general population. To do so, we measured the
average view count of all videos in our dataset, which is given by v¯ = 10000,
and used it to measure the productivity difference between good periods
(more than 10000 views on average) and bad periods (less than 10000 views
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on average) through the quantity ∆ = nG−nB. We divided the contributors
into several different groups depending on their number of active periods,
and tested the null hypothesis “∆ ≤ 0” for each group. Table 1 shows the
results from these tests, including the number of contributors considered in
each subgroup, the mean of the ∆ values, and the p-values of the null hypoth-
esis. Notice that the p-values are very small for most groups, which supports
our hypothesis that a competitive factor enters into the productivity of con-
tributors. Also note in Table 1 that the mean of ∆ decreases as the number
of active weeks increases, indicating that those people who made relatively
few contributions care more about their relative performance against other
contributors.
For comparison purposes we also tested the same null hypothesis for v¯ =
median{vt}T−11 (i.e. the median view count of each contributor) which is not
constant but varies from contributor to contributor. The results are listed in
Table 2. We see that in this case the mean of ∆ increases as the number of
active weeks increases, indicating that the productive ones care more about
how they have improved their own performance, rather than comparing with
the rest of the community.
number of active weeks number of contributors ∆-mean p-value
2-9 20061 .59 < .001
10-19 24517 .58 < .001
20-29 7789 .32 < .001
30-39 2153 .09 .11
40-70 515 -.05 .61
Table 1: Tests of the null hypothesis “∆ ≤ 0”, where ∆ = nG − nB mea-
sures the productivity difference between a contributor’s good periods
(in which her contributions received more than 10000 views on average)
and bad periods (less than 10000 views on average). As the number of
active weeks increases, the mean of ∆ decreases.
While the observed correlations between attention and productivity sug-
gest a trend, they do not imply a causal relation between them. In fact, it is
not clear whether an increase in attention causes productivity as a whole to
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number of active weeks number of contributors ∆−mean p-value
2-9 85949 .01 .14
10-19 68317 .15 < .001
20-29 14757 .18 < .001
30-39 3303 .20 < .001
40-70 673 .26 < .01
Table 2: Tests of the null hypothesis “∆ ≤ 0”, where ∆ = nG − nB mea-
sures the productivity difference between a contributor’s good periods
(in which her contributions received more than her median view count)
and bad periods (less than her median view count). As the number of
active weeks increases the mean of ∆ increases.
grow or vice-versa. In order to clarify this issue we used a Granger causality
test, which is a statistical tool that determines causality in terms of predic-
tion accuracy [8]. Given two signals X1 and X2, we say that X1 G-causes X2
if past values of X1 contain information that helps predict future values of
X2. It is important to note that Granger causality is only meaningful if only
found in one direction, i.e. X1 G-causes X2 but X2 does not G-cause X1. If
on the other hand Granger causality is found in both directions it is likely
that X1 and X2 are only correlated and that the correlation is caused by a
third signal.
In order to determine the causal relation between attention and produc-
tivity, we defined v¯t to be the average of the all contributor’s views during
their t’th active period, and similarly we let n¯t be the average of all contrib-
utor’s videos uploads during their t’th active week. We then conducted a
Granger causality test of the hypothesis that v¯t G-causes n¯t, which resulted
in a p-value of 0.01, and of the hypothesis that n¯t G-causes v¯t, which gave a
p-value of 0.61. This result shows that attention plays a determinant role in
the productivity of those uploading videos.
Finally, since it is a common observation that many contributors stop
uploading videos, we decided to test if this behavior was due to the small
number of downloads their videos receive. To do so we considered all the
contributors in our dataset that had not uploaded any videos during the four
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Figure 2: Average number of views vs. i’th to last video. The origin rep-
resents the last video. The average number of views decreases linearly
as contributers approach their last video with correlation of 0.90.
months previous to the date the data was collected.
Figure 2 shows the number of average views as a function of the i’th to
last video. As can be seen, as contributors approach their last video upload
at the origin, the average number of previous views of their videos exhibited
a marked linear decrease. This confirms our conjecture that decreasing at-
tention leads to a lack of productivity, in this case to the point of making
contributors stop uploading any videos.
In summary, by analyzing a massive data set from YouTube we have
shown that the productivity exhibited in crowdsourcing exhibits a strong
positive dependence on attention. Conversely, a lack of attention leads to
a decrease in the number of videos uploaded and the consequent drop in
productivity, which in many cases asymptotes to no uploads whatsoever.
Moreover, we were able to determine that uploaders compare themselves to
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others when having low productivity and to themselves when exceeding a
personal threshold. More generally, these results show that the tragedy of
the digital commons is partly overcome by making the uploading of digital
content a private good paid for by attention.
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